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RECENT DECISIONS
Federal Jurisdiction: Diversity of Citizenship - Substitution
of Administrator Under Federal Rule 25 (a) - Plaintiff, a citizen
of Maryland, commenced an action in the District Court for the West-
ern District of Virginia against a citizen of Virginia to recover damages
for personal injuries. During pendency of the action the plaintiff died
as a result of the injuries sustained in the accident. Counsel for the
plaintiff in accordance with FED. R. Civ. P. 25 (a)' filed a motion for
the substitution of the duly appointed administrator c.t.a. of the de-
cedent plaintiff's estate as party plaintiff. The administrator was a
citizen of Virginia as required by the Virginia code.2 Counsel also
moved that a supplemental bill under FkD. R. Civ. P. 15(d) 3 be allowed
amending the complaint pursuant to the requirements of section 8-640
of the Virginia Code so as to convert the action into one for wrongful
death under sections 8-633 and 8-634 of the Virginia Code. Section
8-640 of the Virginia Code requires a conversion of an action for per-
sonal injuries, where the plaintiff dies pending the action, into one
brought under Section 8-633 and 8-634, the wrongful death statutes,
and all further proceedings must be as if the action had been filed initi-
ally under the wrongful death statutes. The Supreme Court of Vir-
ginia had held that under section 8-640 and the wrongful death statutes
the right of action for wrongful death did not arise during the con-
tinued life of the injured person nor did the injured person's right
'FED. R. Civ. P. 25 (a), 28 U.S.C.A. Rule 25-Substitution of Parties:
"(a) Death
"1) If a party dies and the claim is not thereby extinguished, the court within
two years after the death may order substitution of the proper parties.
If substitution is not so made, the action shall be dismissed as to the
deceased party. The motion for substitution may be made by the succes-
sors or representatives of the deceased party or by any party and, to-
gether with the notice of hearing, shall be served on the parties as
provided in Rule 5 and upon persons not parties in the manner provided
in Rule 4 for the service of a summons, and may be served in any
judicial district.
"2) In the event of the death of one or more of the plaintiffs or of one or
more of the defendants in an action in which the right sought to be en-
forced survives only to the surviving plaintiffs or only against the surviv-
ing defendants, the action does not abate. The death shall be suggested
upon the record and the action shall proceed in favor of or against the
surviving parties."
2 CODE 1950 VA. 26-59 renders it imperative that the personal representative
bringing an action for wrongful death in accordance with CODE 1950 VA. 8-633
and 8-634 must be a resident of Virginia. The U.S. Court of Appeals in Holt
v. Middlebrook, 214 F. 2d 187 (4th Cir. 1954) has held that this is binding on
the Federal Courts.
3 FE. R. Civ. P. 15 (d), 28 U.S.C.A. Rule 15 (d)--"Supplemental Pleadings.
Upon a motion of a party the court may, upon reasonable notice and upon
such terms as are just, permit him to serve a supplemental pleading setting
forth transactions or occurrences or events which have happened since the
date of the pleading sought to be supplemented. If the court deems it ad-
visable that the adverse party pleads thereto, it shall so order, specifying the
time therefore."
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of action for personal injuries survive his death, if death resulted from
the injury. The District Court allowed the substitution of the admin-
istrator as party plaintiff and the supplemental bill; however, the court
on its own initiative raised the question of jurisdiction and, finding
that the plaintiff administrator and defendant were both citizens of
Virginia, ordered that the action should be dismissed for want of
jurisdiction.4
Plaintiff administrator appealed from the order. The United States
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed. 5 It held that the
administrator's supplemental bill allowed under Rule 15 (d) was, under
the Virginia Statutes as construed by the Supreme Court of that State,
a new and different right of action in complete substitution of the right
of action of the decedent and that consequently the citizenship of the
administrator, and not the citizenship of the decedent, was, controlling
for the purpose of determining diversity of citizenship. Therefore the
action was properly dismissed for want of jurisdiction.
In cases of mere formal substitution of an administrator or exe-
cutor under Rule 25(a), namely, where the personal representative is
substituted to prosecute the action in aid of the same right asserted by
the decedent, the citizenship of the decedent and not that of the repre-
sentative controls for the purpose of determining whether diversity
exists.4 The last cited case was a stockholder's derivative suit. An
action was commenced by the plaintiff, a citizen of New York, against
the defendant corporations and directors, citizens of Delaware and
California respectively. The plaintiff died while the action was pending
and a special administrator, a citizen of California, was substituted.
The Court held that the citizenship of the decedent governed. The
reason for this is the general well-established principle that jurisdiction
once attached is not defeated by subsequent events. Thus it is not
defeated by a subsequent change of citizenship of one of the parties
to the action.7 Chief Justice Marshall said in the last cited case, "It is
quite clear that the jurisdiction of the court depends upon the state of
things at the time of the action brought, and that after vesting, it can-
not be ousted by subsequent events."8
The rationale, that jurisdiction is tested by the facts as they existed
when the action is brought, is applied to a situation where a party dies
and a non-diverse representative is substituted.'
4 Relying on FED. RULE Civ. P. 12(h), 28 U.S.C.A. Rule 12 (h) "--2-That
whenever it appears by suggestion of the parties or otherwise that the court
lacks jurisdiction of the subject matter, the court shall dismiss the action .. "
5 Grady v. Irvine, 254 F. 2d 224 (4th Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 819(1958).
6 Smith v. Sperling, 354 U.S. 91 (1957).
7 Mollan v. Torrance, 9 Wheat. 537 (U.S. 1824).
8 Ibid at 539.
9 Dunn v. Clark, 8 Pet. 1 (U.S. 1834).
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However, the foregoing principles are inapplicable where, as in the
principal case, there is no mere formal substitution of the personal
representative in aid of the same right of action asserted by the de-
cedent and derived from him, but the representative by amendment
seeks to assert a new right of action for wrongful death. Here the
well settled rule that where a personal representative initially files an
action for wrongful death it is the resident of the representative, not
that of his decedent, which is relevant in the resolution, for the pur-
poses of federal jurisdiction, of the question of diversity of citizenship
is applicable. 10
The reason for the latter rule, namely, using the citizenship of the
representative rather than the citizenship of the decedent to determine
diversity, is that the executor or administrator is the real party in
interest before the court and no other persons are capable of suing and
being sued."-
Other situations where the citizenship of the representative governs
are in actions by trustees litigating for the benefit of their beneficiaries.
The rule in regard to trustees is that if the trustee is personally quali-
fied by his citizenship to bring suit in the federal court, the jurisdiction
is not defeated by the fact that the beneficiary may be disqualified.'12
Diversity jurisdiction in an action by a guardian for the benefit of
the ward is more complex. Here the powers and duties of a guardian
to sue are determined by the state law. If the pertinent state statute
does not give the guardian title in the ward's estate and the right to
maintain an action in his own name to recover property belonging to
the ward, it appears that the citizenship of the ward, not that of the
guardian, governs diversity jurisdiction. 3
What would be the effect of the holding of the main case under
Wisconsin law? Assume A, a citizen of Illinois, commences an action
against B, a citizen of Wisconsin, in the Federal District Court for the
Eastern District of Wisconsin for personal injuries sustained in Wis-
consin due to B's negligence involving the jurisdictional amount. Fur-
ther assume that A dies while the action is pending and, a duly ap-
pointed administrator, a citizen of Wisconsin, is substituted as party
plaintiff under Federal Rule 25 (a). What would be the effect on
the jurisdiction of the court?
Under the Wisconsin survival statute' 4 an action for personal in-
juries is authorized to be brought on behalf on a decedent's estate,
10 Chappel Claine v. Dechenaux, 4 Branch 306 (U.S. 1808) ; Mexican Central R.
Co. v. Eckman, 187 U.S. 429, 434 (1902) ; Mecom v. Fitzsimmons Drilling Co.,
284 U.S. 183, 186 (1931).
1 Childress v. Emor, 8 Wheat. 642, 669 (U.S. 1823).
"2Susquehanna and Wyoming Valley Railroad and Coal Company v. Blatchford,
78 U.S. 172 (1870).
"3Ansaldi v. Kennedy, 41 F. 2d 858, 859 (D. Mass. 1930) ; Mexican Central R.
Co. v. Eckman, 187 U.S. 429, 434 (1902).
'4 Wis. STATS. §331.03 (1957) "What Actions Survive. In addition to the actions
1959].-
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and the proceeds of the action are distributed as personal property.
The cause of action is considered to arise at the time of injury or
wrong and to inhere in the decedent while alive.1 5 Such cause of action
is separate and distinct from that given by the Wisconsin wrongful
death statute,"" which substantially follows the Lord Campbell Act of
England, enacted in 1846.17 The death statute authorizes compensation
for damages to the prescribed beneficiaries including both pecuniary
loss and loss of society and companionship. The wrongful death right
of action does not arise until the death of the person injured. It is
a new right of action not for the benefit of the decedent's estate, but
solely for the benefit of the beneficiaries named in the statute."8
Applying the rule of Smith v. Sperling'9 to the assumed facts it is
apparent that the substitution of a Wisconsin citizen as administrator
would not affect the Federal Court's jurisdiction of the action for per-
sonal injuries, because under section 331.01 the personal representative
would be prosecuting the same right of action that A was prosecuting
prior to his demise. Therefore there would be a mere formal sub-
stitution and the citizenship of the deceased would govern and not that
of the substituted personal representative.
However, if the personal representative filed a supplemental bill
and attempted under Rule 18(a)20 to join the cause of action for
wrongful death it appears that the court would have to dismiss the
second cause for lack of jurisdiction, the reason being that the cause
of action for wrongful death attempted to be joined would involve the
assertion of a different right than that asserted by the decedent. The
citizenship of the substituted personal representative governs and not
that of the decedent under the rule of Grady v. Irvine. The fact that
which survive at common law the following shall also survive: Actions for
the recovery of personal property or the unlawful withholding or conversion
thereor, for the recovery of the possession of real estate and for the unlawful
withholding of the possession thereof, for assault and battery, false imprison-
ment or other damages to the person. . . ." Emphasis added.
'5 Kohler v. Waukesha Milk Co., 190 Wis. 52, 55, 208 N.W. 901 (1926).
16 WIs. STATS. §331.03 (1957) Recovery For Death By Wrongful Act. Whenever
the death of a person shall be caused by a wrongful act, neglect or default
and the act, neglect or default is such as would, if death had not ensued,
have entitled the party injured to maintain an action and recover damages
in respect thereof, then in every such case the person who, or the corporation
which, would have been liable, if death had not ensued shall be liable to an
action for damages not withstanding his prior death and not withstanding the
death of the person injured; provided, that such action shall be brought for a
death caused in this state ..
17 See 1937 Wis. L. REv. 234.
Is Brown v. Chicago and Northwestern Ry. Co., 102 Wis. 137, 140, 77 N.W. 748
(1899); Estate of Arneberg, 184 Wis. 570, 200 N.W. 557 (1924). See also
WIs. STATS. §331.04 (1957).
19 Supra note 6.
20 FED. R. Civ. P. 18(a), 28 U.S.C. Rule 18(a) "Joinder of Claims and Remedies.
The plaintiff in his complaint or in a reply setting forth a counterclaim and
the defendant in an answer setting forth a counterclaim may join either as
independent or as alternate claims as many claims either legal or equitable
or both as he may have against an opposing party .. "
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Rule 18 (a) permits the joinder of independent claims would not
change the result. The usual principles of jurisdiction must be met
in relation to any claim that is joined. As said in MooRE's FEDERAL
RULES :21 "It should be borne in mind that Rule 18 is only a procedural
rule relating to joinder of claims and remedies; and that under Rule
8222 jurisdiction and venue are not affected. .. "
The dismissal of a supplemental bill joining the cause of action for
wrongful death could be avoided in Wisconsin by substituting a citizen
of Illinois as administrator to continue the litigation. Unlike Virginia,
Wisconsin does not require the administrator to be a citizen of this
state. A duly appointed administrator of a foreign jurisdiction may
prosecute the action for wrongful death. The basis appears to be that
full faith and credit should be given to the judicial proceedings of the
foreign jurisdiction appointing the party as administrator of the de-
cedent's estate. 22
Grady v. Irvine illustrates the interrelation of principles of Federal
jurisdiction, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the law of the
state where the District Court is sitting which the pleader must con-
sider in charting his course when a person has commenced an action
in the Federal District Court for personal injuries and dies as a result
of the injuries while the action is pending.
GERALD S. WALsH
Decedents' Estates: Liability for Payment of Joint Mortgage
Debt as Between Estate of Deceased Co-Owner and Survivor-
Real estate was conveyed to husband and wife as tenants by the entire-
ties. Thereafter both husband and wife executed a joint and several
bond secured by a mortgage on the realty. The husband died testate
before any mortgage payments were made. His will contained numer-
ous bequests, including a bequest to the widow of $35,000, plus a
direction for the order of payment in case the funds were insufficiint
to meet all bequests.' The document also contained a general provision
directing the executors to pay "all my just debts." During administra-
tion, it became evident that estate assets were insufficient to pay all
bequests plus the mortgage debt. The executors sought instructions
as to the percentage of the debt for which the estate was liable, the
widow contending that the estate must pay the entire debt or at least
contribute fifty percent if she paid it. The lower court refused to
award contribution to the wife and held she was solely responsible
21 Moop's FEDERAL RULES AND FoRms 128 (1956).
22 FED. R. Civ. P. 82, 28 U.S.C. Rule 82 "Jurisdiction and Venue Unaffected.
These rules shall not be constructed to extend or limit the jurisdiction of the
United States District Courts or the venue or the actions therein."
32 Robertson v. C., St. P., M. & 0. R. Co., 122 Wis. 66, 74, 99 N.W. 1135 (1904).
'In re Keil's Estate, 140 A. 2d 139 (Orph's Ct. Del. 1958).
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